The peaceful settlement of disputes between states had long depended on the existence of institutions capable of delivering binding decisions and inducing states to respect them. The International Court of Justice occupied the central position within that framework, and since its inception in 1946 had delivered judgments across a wide range of inter-state disputes. However, the binding character conferred on those judgments did not, of itself, guarantee that they were complied with. This article examined the effectiveness, or otherwise, of ICJ judgments, having regard to their legal nature, the extent to which they secured meaningful outcomes, the challenges that undermined their effectiveness, and the measures capable of strengthening it. Adopting a doctrinal methodology, the article found, first, that effectiveness was structurally constrained by the absence of an independent coercive enforcement mechanism and by the vulnerability of Security Council enforcement under Article 94(2) to the veto. It found, second, that formal compliance by a losing state did not, by itself, guarantee that a judgment achieved its underlying purpose, since institutional weaknesses on either side of a dispute could independently undermine effectiveness. Accordingly, the article recommended a voluntary veto restraint for Article 94(2) referrals, a standing compliance-monitoring body, advance domestic implementing legislation, and independently audited reparations-distribution mechanisms. It concluded that the effectiveness of ICJ judgments was not an inherent property of the Court's legal and institutional design but a contingent outcome dependent on political will and institutional capacity at every level.